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 Globalisation, Crime 
and Governance 
 Transparency, Accountability 
and Participation as Principles 
for Global Criminal Law 
 PAUL  DE HERT 1 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 THE AIM OF this chapter is to look for analytical tools at an abstract level to help further the debate on the many legal and practical issues besetting the public spheres of transitional and international criminal 
justice. To that end, I propose a  global criminal law perspective, encompass-
ing both transitional justice and international criminal law  and transna-
tional criminal law, and inquire into the principles that could guide us. Can 
we simply apply domestic principles of criminal law and criminal justice 
at the trans-state level ? Admittedly, a theoretical framework developed for 
sovereign states can be adapted to an interstate context. Yet, the inherent 
weaknesses of the modern principled approach to criminal law remain — for 
instance, the lack of an empirical basis, and of respect in practice, for the 
use of the harm criterion or the  ultima ratio principle. The result is a certain 
cynicism regarding the actual capacity of modern criminal law principles to 
steer legislative and judicial developments. 
 I suggest looking elsewhere when discussing how to govern and imple-
ment  global criminal justice and advocate a procedural approach, relying 
on two theoretical frameworks. The fi rst was proposed by Brants, Mevis 
and Prakken in 2001, and looks to procedurally oriented principles to 
address criminal justice issues, in particular transparency,  accountability 
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 2  For a defi nition of globalisation (as a phenomenon of increasing interconnectedness of 
societies) and a discussion of alternative defi nitions, see  KF  Aas ,  Globalization and Crime 
( Los Angeles ,  Sage ,  2007 )  3 – 6 . 
 3  N   Boister ,  An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law ( Oxford ,  Oxford University 
Press ,  2012 )  13 and 18 . 
 4  See  P  Kotiswaran and  N  Palmer ,  ‘ Rethinking the  “ International Law of Crime ” : 
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See also  N  Boister ,  ‘ Refl ections on the Concept of Transnational Criminal Law ’ ( 2015 )  6 ( 1 ) 
 Transnational Legal Theory  9 . 
 5  See Kotiswaran and Palmer,  ‘ Rethinking ’ (2015) 55 – 88. 
and  participation. The second is also a call for a procedural approach but 
launched in the context of the Global Administrative Law project and the 
debate on global constitutionalism. Can these two approaches be con-
nected ? What are their limits and possibilities for global criminal justice and 
their application for global criminal law ? Finally, how do they interrelate 
and could they provide a way forward in terms of a methodology to judge 
their application in each and every single case, given the many insights on 
this to be found in governance literature ? 
 II. WHAT IS GLOBAL CRIMINAL LAW ? 
 The traditional presentation of the institutions, norms and crimes,  processes 
and personnel of international criminal law always puzzles me, a legal 
 theorist. It is simply too state-centred, too much based on old intuitions 
and seemingly oblivious to today ’ s conversation about criminal law in a 
global era 2 that moves beyond  international crimes, criminals and courts. 
Let us review some of the basic facts. International criminal law focuses on 
 core crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanities and aggres-
sion). But why are these  core crimes ? Why the predicate  ‘ core ’ in light of 
their ever-expanding scope ? Should the mandate of international criminal 
tribunals be extended to, for instance, terrorism; do we simply admit that 
the core has grown too ? Again, what is this the core  of ? The discussion lacks 
context and perspective, losing sight of crimes equally blameworthy as those 
belonging to this alleged  ‘ core ’ , and strongly related to globalisation, such 
as the traffi cking of human beings, transnational corruption or online fraud. 
 Neil Boister has tried to save the concept of international criminal law 
by distinguishing between  International Criminal Law Stricto Sensu and 
 Transnational Criminal Law , 3 the latter being a legal counterpart to  ‘ trans-
national crimes ’ resulting from the negative externalities associated with the 
liberalised movement of persons, products and services. 4 Boister ’ s  theoretical 
defence of the distinction between the two systems qua substance, mode of 
development and overall policy goals has not met with enthusiasm, 5 but at 
least he creates a window on criminal law in a global era. 
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 6  Boister ,  An Introduction ( 2012 )  13 and 18 . 
 7  See  N  Walker ,  Intimations of Global Law ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University Press ,  2015 ) . 
 8  PS  Berman ,  Global Legal Pluralism :  A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders ( New York , 
 Cambridge University Press ,  2012 )  4 . 
 9  ibid 4. 
 However, even in Boister ’ s approach, the perspective is still inspired by 
traditional international law. He defi nes  Transnational Criminal Law as 
 ‘ the indirect suppression by international law through domestic penal law 
of criminal activities that have actual or potential trans-border effects ’ , 6 
a  defi nition that explains why the bulk of his book concerns  not today ’ s 
crimes, victims, criminals and stakeholders of globalisation, but those 
selected crimes that are the object of bilateral and multilateral conventions 
between states and international organisations. I am still waiting for the fi rst 
convention incriminating atrocities against illegal migrants or the starvation 
of populations due to neoliberal economic reform plans. These  ‘ crimes that 
are not crimes ’ should be the object of a conversation about criminal law in 
a global era, but are absent in the legalistic contours of the  Transnational 
Criminal Law project. 
 Particularly missing is a complete description of the real actors of 
 globalisation. Understanding the importance of new and non-state actors 
is a central tenet in the booming literature on what is called  Global Law . 7 
In today ’ s setting, several players claim authority to control a given legal 
 situation, and a single act or actor is potentially regulated by multiple legal 
or quasi-legal regimes. 8 Gone are the simple schemes with autonomous, 
 territorially distinct spheres, where activities and actors fall under the legal 
jurisdiction of one single regime at a time. 9 Bernam labels the new landscape 
as one of jurisdictional hybridity, where there is confusion and confl ict about 
what norms are applicable. Possible alternative labels are  multi-layeredness 
and  fragmentation . 
 The fascinating example that comes to mind are the hybrid or interna-
tionalised criminal tribunals, such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Panels 
for Serious Crimes in Timor, the  ‘ Regulation 64 ’ Panels in Kosovo, the War 
Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon. These courts illustrate the  multi-layeredness central to global law 
understanding: their institutional set-up and applicable law is a blend of 
international and domestic law. Going beyond these new forms of interna-
tional criminal justice mechanisms that are still relatively traditional (they 
are  ‘ courts ’ after all!) are actors such as the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council, human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs), recog-
nised international and national media, newcomers such as WikiLeaks and 
so forth. All play an important role in today ’ s discussion on criminal law 
in a global era. Amnesty International ’ s recent policy change in favour of 
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 10  See J Neuwirth,  ‘ Amnesty International Says Prostitution is a Human Right — But it ’ s 
Wrong ’ ,  The Guardian (29 July 2015),  www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/
jul/28/amnesty-international-prostitution-sex-work-human-traffi cking . See also N Grimley, 
 ‘ Amnesty International Row: Should Prostitution be Decriminalised? ’ ,  BBC News (11 August 
2015),  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-33850749 . 
 11  O  Kessler and  W  Werner ,  ‘ Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management ’ ( 2008 )  39 ( 2 – 3 ) 
 Security Dialogue  289 . 
 12  P  De Hert and  M  Kopcheva ,  ‘ International Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Law 
Made Redundant :  A Comment on the Belgian Yahoo! Case ’ ( 2011 )  27 ( 3 )  Computer Law  & 
Security Review  291 . See also Boister (n 3) on  ‘ norm entrepreneurialism ’ , by which (usually 
powerful) states export their domestic criminal laws into the international realm. 
 13  Compare with the short discussions of this  ‘ paradigm ’ by  B  Kotecha ,  ‘ Book Review of 
Alison Bisset, Truth Commissions and Criminal Courts (Cambridge University Press, 2014) ’ 
( 2015 )  3  Journal of International Criminal Justice  409 – 18 . 
decriminalising consensual adult sex work worldwide is a case in point and 
changes the role of the organisation in setting policies. The same can be said 
of the critics (some of them famous Hollywood stars) who disagree with 
Amnesty ’ s new policy with arguments about the evil of human traffi cking 
behind the sex work industry. 10 And our traditional understanding of inter-
national criminal justice certainly fails to capture offi cial unilateral policies, 
beyond established mechanisms of accountability, by individual states: the 
US and Israel on extrajudicial killings of suspected persons, for example, 11 
or Belgium on obtaining data stored by providers in other countries. 12 
 The global law lens can help us ask relevant and new questions: how can 
we identify and assess the impact of old and new actors in the international 
and transnational landscape ? Does conceiving of certain activities, such 
as environmentally harmful activities, rights abuses that are a product of 
global trade or corruption as global rather than international crime, allow 
us more insight into the nature of, or solutions to, particularly thorny or 
heinous problems ? Can we understand local responses to the blunt end of 
transnationally driven crimes better by examining them through a global 
law lens ? Have the forces of globalisation, simultaneously drawing us closer 
together by making the globe smaller yet increasing fragmentation between 
normative orders, created new types of criminals, operating in a (legal) 
space that is not national, international or transnational ? Do such criminals 
create new types of victims, whose sufferings engender claims that cannot be 
adequately addressed by the existing frameworks of criminal law ? Are there 
(criminal) justice claims or responses that are  ‘ global ’ ? Perhaps the response 
to certain crimes, such as corruption, is necessarily global ? Can we observe 
a  ‘ global criminal law ’ apart from and beyond the institutions, norms, pro-
cesses and personnel of international criminal law ? How does global crimi-
nal law relate to existing institutions or is it non-institutional by nature ? 
 It is fair to say that these questions perfectly fi t the project or paradigm of 
transitional justice, 13 with its eye for the multiplicity of actors and mecha-
nisms involved in post-confl ict situations. But the label of  global criminal 
Globalisation, Crime and Governance 95
 14  To my knowledge, the term  Global Criminal Law fi rst appears in  O  H ö ffe ,  Democracy in 
an Age of Globalisation ( Dordrecht ,  Springer ,  2007 )  262 – 68 . 
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Law ’ ( 2011 )  1 ( 1 )  European Criminal Law Review  6, 28 . 
 19  ‘ The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy in 2011 ’ ( 2011 )  1  European Criminal Law 
Review  86 – 103 . 
law allows us to go beyond these post-confl ict situations, which are only 
part of what is going on, and to focus on all criminal law developments 
related to international criminal law and globalisation. 14 The question is 
what principles or general criteria should govern or frame it ? 
 III. WHY PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW ? 
 Criminal law can be either conceived as a mere instrument at the service 
of effective law and (cross-border) crime control or, conversely, as a spe-
cial fi eld deserving special care because of its particularly invasive character. 
Attempts to identify this  ‘ special fi eld ’ often aim to protect criminal law 
from infl ated instrumental use as a policy tool that can be used in all pos-
sible situations, even in those where the link with traditional criminal law 
logic is weak. Principles play a primordial role here, 15 as they do in global 
law scholarship. 16 Horders calls these voices a  ‘ counterreformation ’ in crim-
inal law scholarship, 17 advocating the return to general basic principles: the 
use of criminal law should be restricted to serious kinds of  wrongdoing and 
criminalisation to wrongdoing accompanied by fault — preferably wrong 
actions rather than culpable omissions; or the onus of proof should rest 
with the state. 
 The call for principles also forms part of signifi cant criticism of attempts 
to harmonise substantive criminal law by the EU. 18 A 2009  Manifesto on 
European Criminal Policy enumerates relevant principles that should guide 
EU substantive criminal law: 19 four criteria concerning in the selection of 
behaviour deserving criminal punishment are the principle of legitimate 
interest, the principle of  ultima ratio , the principle of coherence and the 
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 20  L  Foffani ,  ‘ Il Manifesto sulla Politica Criminale Europea ’ ( 2010 )  Criminalia  657, 665 . 
 21  M  Mass é ,  JP  Jean and  A  Giudicielli (eds),  Un droit p é nal postmoderne ? Mise en perspec-
tive des  é volutions et ruptures contemporaines ( Paris ,  PUF ,  2009 ) . On the specifi c point of the 
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sidiarit é ’ in  A  Giudicielli-Delage and  C  Lazerges (eds),  Le Droit P é nal de l ’ Union Europ é enne 
au Lendemain du Trait é de Lisbonne ( Paris ,  Soci é t é de L é gislation Compar é e ,  2012 ) . 
 22  See the retrospective analysis of these discussions in  M  Groenhuijsen and  T  Kooijmans 
(eds),  The Reform of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure in Comparative Perspective 
( Leiden ,  Brill ,  2012 ) . 
 23  CH  Brants ,  PAM  Mevis and  E  Prakken (eds),  Legitieme strafvordering. Rechten van de 
mens als inspiratie in de 21ste eeuw ( Antwerp ,  Intersentia ,  2001 )  1 – 21 . 
 24  ibid 2, 7 and 19. 
principle of subsidiarity. As has been rightly noted, 20 the  Manifesto contains 
some principles which are not all criminal law-specifi c. In particular, subsid-
iarity and coherence are defi ned as  ‘ meta-principles ’ and are distinguished 
from  ‘ well-established and fundamental principles of criminal law ’ (such as 
 ultima ratio and legitimate interest or legality and guilt), although even here 
doubts are raised about their validity as guiding principles for national and 
European criminal law and their respect in practice. 21 Very general princi-
ples, not necessarily context-specifi c, such as subsidiarity, coherence and 
proportionality might be preferable to no principles at all. But that would 
still leave unanswered the question of the specifi city of criminal law and the 
need for specifi c principles capable of limiting its expansion. 
 Transparency, together with other governance or administrative law 
 principles such as accountability and participation, fi gures predominantly 
in many policy  and academic writings on global justice. The authors behind 
the 2005 Global Administrative Law Project, for instance, propose it as a 
key procedural principle, while in 2001 Brants et al insisted on governance 
principles such as transparency, accountability and participation as start-
ing points for domestic criminal law reform. Given that the main focus of 
this volume is the concept of transparency, it is to these principles that 
I now turn. 
 IV. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND PARTICIPATION 
IN CRIMINAL LAW (BRANTS ET AL) 
 Around the turn of the century, there were intensive discussions in the 
 Netherlands about a possible reform of the Dutch  Code of Criminal 
 Procedure . 22 A research group  ‘ Strafvordering 2001 ’ was asked to examine 
how a new code should look, given contemporary needs and standards. 
Critics of its proposals included Brants, Mevis and Prakken, who saw a 
legitimate criminal law system as anchored in three key notions: transpar-
ency, accountability and participation; 23 not principles but  central starting 
points ,  requirements, key notions and  central notions . 24 These are said to 
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 25  ibid 7 – 8. 
 26  ibid 10 – 11. 
 27  ibid 8 – 10. 
 28  B  Kingsbury ,  N  Krisch and  RB  Stewart ,  ‘ The Emergence of Global Administrative Law ’ 
( 2005 )  68  Law and Contemporary Problems  15 . See also  N  Krisch ,  ‘ Global Administrative 
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 DH  Rached ,  ‘ Doomed Aspiration of Pure Instrumentality :  Global Administrative Law and 
Accountability ’ ( 2014 )  3  Global Constitutionalism  338 ;  A  Somek ,  ‘ The Concept of  “ Law ” in 
Global Administrative Law :  A Reply to Benedict Kingsbury ’ ( 2009 )  20 ( 4 )  European Journal 
of International Law  985 . 
 29  A  Peters ,  ‘ The Constitutionalisation of International Organisations ’ in  N  Walker ,  J  Shaw 
and  S  Tierney (eds),  Europe ’ s Constitutional Mosaic ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2011 )  253 . 
derive from constitutionalism and the case law of the European Court on 
Human Rights, though elsewhere the authors attribute them to the legacy of 
the Enlightenment and consider them interwoven with the principles of the 
rule of law and democracy — touchstones which all criminal proceedings of 
a democratic state should meet. 
 Participation refers to participation of the accused and the public, but 
also of the victim and other private persons (eg, investigators, consultants 
and experts) in criminal proceedings. 25  Transparency refers to publicity of 
court procedures, both external and internal, and is a key notion in deter-
mining the role of the media in the criminal justice system. 26  Accountability 
is the standard for assessing the respective responsibilities and duties of the 
actors involved in the criminal justice system to account for themselves: 
what accountability structures are there ? What kinds of accounts need to be 
provided ? Who can set existing control and accountability mechanisms in 
motion ? Accountability refers to the duty to justify oneself and to develop 
practices to do so, but also to the duty to set up structures that allow this 
account-giving in front of someone. 27 
 V. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
IN GLOBAL LAW (THE GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROJECT) 
 Brants, Mevis and Prakken specifi cally aimed at infl uencing Dutch law 
reform, but the standards they identify are presented as general reference 
points for all criminal states that are respectful of the rule of law, democracy 
and human rights. In the literature on globalisation and global law, the same 
standards are also central in the Global Administrative Law project pro-
posed by Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart in 2005. 28 The Global Administra-
tive Law project should be understood in the context of the debate between 
global constitutionalism and global pluralism. 29 Both schools look at global 
developments, the growing interconnectedness of actors, the changing role 
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 30  H ö ffe ,  Democracy ( 2007 )  262 – 68 . 
 31  Kingsbury ,  Krisch and  Stewart ,  ‘ The Emergence ’ ( 2005 )  26 . 
of the state and the growing impact of international and national non-state 
actors, and both detect many accountability problems, but the solutions 
they offer differ. 
 Constitutionalism is of course familiar to us all, since it is a way of organ-
ising states. It is about the rule of law, checks and balances, human rights 
protection and also to a somewhat lesser degree democracy. Global consti-
tutionalists  ‘ see ’ and  ‘ defend ’ constitutionalisation  beyond the state. The 
growing body of international human rights law, the success of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) and the success of the transformation of the 
European Community into a more constitutionalist  EU fuel this movement 
and encourage it to continue. The analogy with the  ‘ counterreformation ’ 
in criminal law scholarship is not hard to see. Otfried H ö ffe, for example, 
assumes that everything is already in place for an overarching system of 
criminal law, based on a division of work between an international court 
and domestic systems. This optimistic perspective allows H ö ffe to set out 
a full programme for global criminal law that assumes common principles 
and minima, and the creation of a global world court that would not only 
judge core crimes, but would also serve as an appeal court. 30 
 Global pluralists like Krisch and Bernman underline the attractiveness of 
the constitutionalist endeavour, but see many objections, ranging from the 
practical ( ‘ it will never be realized ’ ) to the normative ( ‘ diversity is good ’ ,  ‘ we 
should respect political choices made by other states ’ ). The Global Adminis-
trative Law project presents itself as a spin-off from global pluralism and as 
an alternative whose methodology and understanding of current globalisa-
tion developments differs from constitutionalism. It is driven by the percep-
tion that the evolution of global law mostly engages issues of administrative 
rather than constitutional law or, alternatively, can be better understood 
from a more administrative than ambitious, constitutional, principles-based 
perspective. The authors behind the Global Administrative Law project are 
concerned about the de facto independence and discretion of transnational 
actors with some sort of decision-making power. 31 But rather than incor-
porating strong constitutional machinery, they propose the organisation of 
good governance through guarantees, mechanisms and values such as trans-
parency and participation. These are mainly process-related (as opposed 
to substantive) values that suggest only modest interventions; institutional 
reform  ‘ writ small ’ , one step at a time with prudent attention to non-ideal 
factual contexts, and aimed at legitimising accountability arrangements of 
institutions beyond the state. 
 In their 2005 book, Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart hardly touch upon 
criminal law issues. Yet, there are also non-judicial actors on the global 
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and public information activities. On the ICC, see  M  Holvoet and  M  Mema ,  ‘ The Interna-
tional Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect ’ in  D  Fiott and  J  Koops (eds),  The 
 Responsibility to Protect and the Third Pillar :  Legitimacy and Operationalization  ( Basingstoke , 
 Palgrave Macmillan ,  2014 )  23 , with reference to  R  Cryer ,  H  Friman ,  D  Robinson and 
 E  Wilmshurst ,  An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure ( Cambridge , 
 Cambridge University Press ,  2007 )  22 – 39 ;  H  Olasolo ,  ‘ The ICC ’ s Timely Intervention as 
a Result of Threats of Future Atrocity Crimes ’ in  H  Olasolo (ed),  Essays on International 
 Criminal Justice ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2012 )  1 – 19 . 
criminal law scene. Even the traditional judicial actors (courts, judges and 
prosecutors) should be seen as holding decision-making powers and gov-
ernance responsibilities. 32 All through the ICC  Lubanga trial, judges and 
prosecutor were at odds regarding the selection of crimes to be tried and 
victims to be heard at trial. 33 Moreover, increasingly courts and prosecutors 
at all levels will be confronted with the need to foster a global administra-
tion of criminal justice ( ‘ do we prosecute or will others ? ’ ), 34 a task requiring 
an understanding of good governance and notions such as transparency, 
accountability and participation. A fi ne example of this development is the 
ICC Prosecutor ’ s strategic policy plan and the willingness of the current 
ICC Prosecutor to seek acceptance for her policy options. 35 Governance 
requirements that Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart would impose on admin-
istrations must also be met when courts and prosecutors go beyond mere 
adjudication. 36 
 VI. TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
IN GLOBAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 What Brants, Mevis and Prakken and the Global Administrative Law authors 
propose is not easy. Western legal education has been thoroughly moulded 
by constitutionalism and the belief that principles exist with regard to the 
general organisation of both the state and the criminal system. Criminal law 
and procedure have been theorised and regulated since the Enlightenment 
by a model based on principles such as legality, specifi c benchmarks for guilt 
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 37  See  M  Reglitz ,  ‘ Political Legitimacy without a (Claim-)Right to Rule ’ ( 2015 )  21  Res 
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 38  S  Williams ,  ‘ Review of John D. Ciorciari and Anne Heindel,  Hybrid Justice: The Extraor-
dinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Michigan University Press, 2014) ’ ( 2015 )  13 
 Journal of International Criminal Justice  660, 661 . 
and conviction assessments (such as beyond reasonable doubt), which are 
somehow similarly grounded in the concept of the rule of law, and human 
rights principles and considerations. Brants et al, while not denying this, 
shift the perspective to the procedural. Both the Global Administrative Law 
project and Brants et al ’ s proposal take stock of the failures of traditional 
global constitutionalism and traditional principled approaches to criminal 
law, and rely on concepts such as transparency, accountability and partici-
pation as a viable solution. 
 I advocate using Brants et al ’ s model at the global level and expanding the 
Global Administrative Law analysis to include global criminal law players, 
and to judge and ground their roles and behaviour against and in participa-
tion, transparency and accountability. In the realm of global criminal law, 
both global constitutionalism and substantive principles of criminal justice 
would probably fail to ensure the accountability of the relevant actors. 37 
Indeed, in a global criminal justice context with its variety of actors and 
norms, and time and place as differentiating factors, one cannot but be 
attracted by the pluralist pragmatic step-by-step solutions of the proposal 
of Brants et al and the Global Administrative Law project. These contex-
tual elements explain why the one-size-fi ts-all programme of accountability 
enhancement of the global constitutionalist model, or the mere application 
of general criminal law principles rooted in national constitutional values, is 
less appropriate. The global criminal justice context demands more fl exible, 
process-oriented principles. 
 Let us recall the diversity of the hybrid courts. There is no  ‘ model ’ as such 
and each has been established in a variety of situations and has different 
features depending on the political context: legal basis, structure, applica-
ble law and composition. 38 These hybrid courts will not disappear; on the 
contrary, there are proposals to create many more. Their political dimen-
sion, including the role of the governments that host them, will remain 
very visible. Pushing an ideal constitutionalist design for hybrid courts or 
abandoning them by transferring to the ICC will not (always) be successful, 
but insisting on accountability and transparency could allow us to accept 
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latorias ’ in  RG  Macho (ed),  Ordenaci ó n y transparencia econ ó mica en el derecho p ú blico y 
privado ( Madrid ,  Marcial Pons ,  2014 ) . 
 43  A  Alemanno ,  ‘ Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law :  Transparency, Participa-
tion and Democracy ’ ( 2014 )  39 ( 1 )  European Law Review  72 . On the related notion of public-
ity, see Erkkil ä ,  Government Transparency (2012) 3 – 6. 
that imperfect justice might be better than no justice. 39 The challenge is 
to develop the meaning of transparency, participation and accountability, 
drawing from both theoretical frameworks sketched above, to make them 
operational in the context of transitional and international justice. 
 VII. TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS (THE FIRST 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLE) 
 Transparency has not been uncontested in the history of global governance. 
In some ways it has been a fl agship of neoliberalism. Looking back at the 
past 30 years of economic globalisation, Recalde notes an acute process 
of deregulation or dismantling of regulatory mechanisms, fuelled by mar-
ket scepticism towards the role of regulatory bodies, and a preference for 
self-regulation. In an area freed from supervision and control, transparency 
was advanced as the only indispensable requirement and precondition for 
rational and effi cient decision-making. 40 Yet, last decade ’ s fi nancial crisis 
has shown that transparency did not fulfi l its promise. 41 Its close links to 
deregulation suggests that transparency-based policies have led to less regu-
lation  and participation. Aware of Recalde ’ s critical observations, Barnes 
defends transparency as one of the most basic of principles, a prior con-
dition for the existence of many others. Adding, however, that sometimes 
more than transparency may be needed, such as the requirement to state 
the reasoning behind decisions, the need for control and accountability of 
different bodies and fair representation in membership, and requirements of 
impartibility and independence. 42 
 In his study on  transparency and  openness (limited to EU law), Alberto 
Alemanno highlights their connection but also what sets them apart. 43 Both 
notions convey a common idea: the  ‘ opposite of opaqueness, complexity or 
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 50  Rached (n 28) 361 – 62. 
even secretiveness ’ . Alemanno sees openness as the greater good: transpar-
ency is merely the most developed legal dimension of openness, recognised 
in primary law and developed in EU secondary law and case law. 44 The best-
known application of this legal transparency is the provision of information 
and, correspondingly, the right to access documents, conceived in a passive 
mode and requiring no more than providing individuals with information 
when they specifi cally ask for it. 45 
 A broader, holistic perspective assumes that the duty of transparency 
extends to additional, more active obligations such as using clear language, 
consistently interpreting and applying the law, and supporting action with 
reasons, facilitating both accountability and participation. 46 These addi-
tional duties (seven in total) 47 focus on how information is communicated 
and turn  transparency into  openness. 48 Thus, openness is more than trans-
parency and is itself instrumental to the enjoyment of a right to participate 
in the democratic life of an institution or polity. 
 Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart place considerable weight on transparency 
and its possible application to international actors. How much transparency 
is needed in each case and for every actor depends on several factors (the 
way in which information is communicated, the effectiveness, the useful-
ness for the democratic life of an institution or polity). Transparency is open 
and sensitive to political environments that are poorly regulated by law. 
Rached points to the modular and sector-sensitive nature of principles like 
transparency, as understood by the Global Administrative Law project. One 
needs to verify  ‘ how, in each and every global body, those general principles 
of administrative law are and should be put into effect. The exact mix and 
form, or the particular version of due process that is required in a given sec-
tor,  “ remains very much up for grabs ” ’ . 49 Insisting on transparency neither 
implies universal homogeneity in terms of procedural solutions nor resem-
bles an arbitrary adhocracy. 50 
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 53  M  de Serpa Soares ,  ‘ An Age of Accountability ’ ( 2015 )  13 ( 4 )  Journal of International 
Criminal Justice  669, 670 . 
 54  ibid 670. 
 55  ibid 670, 673. 
 VIII. TRANSPARENCY IN GLOBAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 In the criminal justice context, many questions arise: is there a legal basis 
to require transparency, intended as openness, from global criminal law 
(policy) actors ? And is it enforceable in court ? Does openness require full 
transparency, even at the cost of privacy and other rights of persons con-
cerned ? And, lastly, are there legal or non-legal means other than court 
procedures to promote or enforce it ? These questions will not guarantee 
uniform answers, but nor do they need to. 51 
 Transparency in classic criminal law gives the defendant a legal right to 
access many types of evidence before trial in order to make informed deci-
sions and to minimise surprise at trial. Transparency by judges about their 
work contributes to the idea of procedural justice. 52 Indeed, criminal trials 
in general, international criminal trials and transitional justice methods such 
as truth commissions  are about transparency, in the sense that they provide 
clarity regarding criminal facts affecting individuals and entire populations. 
They are truth-fi nding mechanisms that Miguel de Serpa Soares, a high-
ranking UN offi cial, sees as instrumental to realising a right to know (about 
heinous crimes and the circumstances of their commission) and the right to 
justice (to see perpetrators brought to justice). 53 For De Serpa Soares, in the 
context of the commission of international crimes, both rights are funda-
mental and have an individual  and collective dimension. 54 
 This collective right to the truth has altered the traditional prerogative of 
states to investigate criminal activity, a role now increasingly supplemented 
by that assumed by the international community to investigate, record 
and make known facts about crimes in certain countries that destabilise 
the whole international community. This explains why the UN has cre-
ated numerous different commissions of inquiry,  all , if we believe de Serpa 
Soares, made possible by the broad mandate of the UN to maintain interna-
tional peace and security (Article 1 UN Charter). 55 
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See  A  Whiting ,  ‘ Lead Evidence and Discovery before the International Criminal Court :  The 
Lubanga Case ’ ( 2009 )  14  UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs  207 . 
 60  R  Katzman ,  ‘ The Non-disclosure of Confi dential Exculpatory Evidence and the Lubanga 
Proceedings :  How the ICC Defense System Affects the Accused ’ s Right to a Fair Trial ’ ( 2009 ) 
 8  Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights  77, 78 . 
 61  Whiting,  ‘ Lead Evidence ’ (2009) 207. 
 The coexistence of a plurality of truth-fi nding mechanisms can be a 
 challenge, in particular when considering both trials and truth commis-
sions. For Bisset, trials have a retributive focus on individual cases, while 
truth commissions have an investigatory focus on documenting the past 
and establishing truth. 56 Both have strengths and weaknesses with regard 
to truth-fi nding and both should be applied when appropriate. The impact 
of the ICC and the complementarity principle on the coexistence of trials 
and other truth-fi nding methods is still unclear, but a broad discretion to 
replace trials with truth commissions or amnesties certainly no longer exists. 
One possible option remains to install truth commissions as complementary 
to or as a forerunner of trials. 57 This, however, raises important questions 
about obligations to cooperate and provide assistance to courts and the fur-
ther use of confi dential information and self-incriminating evidence. In this 
connection, Bisset suggests that the ICC should create a transparent policy 
regarding the multi-layeredness of transitional justice in order to help clarify 
respective roles and guarantee overall fairness — for instance, by consulting a 
truth commission to avoid disputes and showing self-restraint by accessing 
confi dential information only as an exception rather than the norm. 58 
 The rule that trials are unfair if the defendant is denied access to many 
types of evidence was confi rmed at the global level by the ICC, which 
ordered Lubanga ’ s release on 2 July 2008 on the grounds that a fair trial 
was impossible given that the Prosecutor had obtained evidence on the con-
dition of confi dentiality and was not willing to share it. The trial contin-
ued only when the Prosecutor agreed to make all confi dential information 
 available. 59 One author spoke about  ‘ behind-the-scenes decision making that 
brought the exculpatory evidence to light and allowed the stay of proceed-
ings to be lifted on 18 November 2008 ’ . 60 The Rome Treaty does mention 
the prosecution ’ s right to obtain confi dential evidence (Article 54(3)(e)) and 
its responsibility to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence (Article 67(2)), 
but commentators fi nd the guidance insuffi cient and foresee more questions 
about the degree to which transparency should be guaranteed. 61 
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pdf . On the infi ltration of OpenLeaks by German government offi cials, see  http://it.slashdot.
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 66  V  Bakir and  A  McStay ,  ‘ Assessing Interdisciplinary Academic and Multi-stakeholder 
 Positions on Transparency in the Post-Snowden Leak Era ’ ( 2015 )  12 ( 3 – 4 )  Ethical Space: 
The International Journal of Communication Ethics  25, 27 . 
 67  P  Lashmar ,  ‘ Spies and Journalists :  Towards an Ethical Framework? ’ ( 2015 )  12 ( 3 – 4 ) 
 Ethical Space. The International Journal of Communication Ethics  4 . See also  T  Crook ,  ‘ Useful 
 Of the non-judicial actors, the fi rst that comes to mind is the UN  Security 
Council with its enormous powers under the UN Charter and, in par-
ticular, its sanctioning powers under Article 41 affecting many aspects of 
global criminal law. 62 Tzanakopoulos has nicely identifi ed the low level of 
engagement of the general public with the Security Council ’ s actions, its 
particularly secretive mode of operation — the result of inappropriate organ-
isational rules — and the effective pressure by Member States and regional 
courts to create more openness about the terrorist sanctions system and 
to accept quasi-external oversight of listing and delisting procedures. 63 
A constitutionalist would rewrite the UN Charter to make its transparency 
provisions more explicit; meanwhile, this is a small step forwards. 
 What about transparency requirements imposed on private actors ? 
Again, the answer needs to be modular and sector-sensitive, with broad 
exceptions for the media and minimally a deontological duty for transna-
tional corporations to report on their own behaviour and interactions with 
governments. 64 Very low transparency can be required from WikiLeaks and 
other similar initiatives that give whistleblowers a voice by publishing cen-
sored or otherwise restricted offi cial materials involving war, spying and 
corruption, and are very vulnerable. 65 The Snowden revelations make clear 
the types of transparency concepts used in discussions about surveillance 
and governmental powers. Very prevalent amongst secret services and law 
enforcement offi cials is the idea of  radical transparency , opening up both 
public processes and private lives of citizens for inspection:  nothing to hide , 
 nothing to fear . 66 This contrasts with the traditional  liberal transparency 
concept focused on the public inspection of state power, rejecting any ten-
dency towards the  ‘ uncheckability ’ of power and granting control and pri-
vacy to law-abiding citizens. One criterion by which to judge the amount of 
transparency will be the actual power of the actor and risks of abuses. This 
rule of thumb explains why more transparency can be required from certain 
corporations, but not from all. For journalists and whistleblowers, the (civil 
liberties) stakes are higher. Here there is simply no rule of thumb, although 
careful ethical consideration can help create some sort of framework. 67 
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Union ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2002 )  7 . 
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 72  Tzanakopoulos (n 51) 4;  M  Bovens ,  ‘ Analysing and Assessing Accountability :  A Concep-
tual Framework ’ ( 2007 )  13 ( 4 )  European Law Journal  447, 460 – 61 . 
 73  Tzanakopoulos (n 51) 10. 
 74  Brants, Mevis and Prakken (n 23) 8 – 10. This view on accountability and its two duties 
can be traced back to the defi nition of Richard Mulgan in his seminal article on accountability: 
 R  Mulgan ,  ‘ Accountability :  An Ever-Expanding Concept? ’ ( 2000 )  78  Public Administration 
 555, 555 , which was written to defend a restrictive view on the defi nition of accountability (at 
571). Mulgan rejects broader uses of the term in literature that create  ‘ confusion ’ and imply 
a  ‘ questionable shift of focus away from the central importance of external scrutiny ’ (at 557). 
 IX. ACCOUNTABILITY (THE SECOND GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLE) 
 Like transparency, accountability has become a global concept of respon-
sible government and governance. The idea that power must be held to 
account is a general principle, not necessarily legal in nature but triggered 
by a  ‘ gut feeling ’ : entities should not exercise power without having to 
somehow account for it. 68 This status as a  gut- felt necessity explains why 
accountability is not only promoted as a standard by global pluralists, but 
also forms part of the global constitutionalist programme for reform beyond 
the state. 69 
 Accountability can be considered the alter ego of transparency 70 and at 
the same time also a fi nal good to which transparency is instrumental. 71 
Accountability is equally modular. There is no universally accepted defi ni-
tion of what accountability is and there is no unique answer to, or form 
or outcome of, accountability problems. The form can be legal, but also 
political, economic, fi nancial, market-based, administrative, hierarchical 
and reputational (and this with many sub-divisions). 72 Like transparency, 
there is no intrinsic link with law. Accountability can exist even when the 
law is silent and there are no independent and impartial third parties to 
decide matters with binding force. 73 Other actors can play a role in enforc-
ing accountability, public opinion being only one of them. Again, contex-
tual solutions, taking into account power confi gurations and what is there 
already, will defi ne responses to  ‘ the who, what, and how ’ question. 
 The foregoing explains why I avoid the traditional presentation of 
accountability as a combination of the (internal) duty to justify oneself and 
to develop practices to do so on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
the (external) duty to set up structures that allow for accountability and 
increase accountability, control and sanctioning. 74 Some authors refuse 
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is that informal arrangements then become problematic. 
 77  See the defi nition of accountability, focusing only on the fi rst duty, given by the Interna-
tional Law Association,  Final Conference Report: Accountability of International Organisa-
tions (International Law Association, 2004):  ‘ the duty to account for the exercise of power ’ . 
See equally these sources for a listing of principles that can make accountability more effective. 
 78  Bovens (n 72) 464. 
to use the term  ‘ accountability ’ for mechanisms based solely on the fi rst 
 (internal-oriented) duty, but not on the (external) second. So,  ‘ accountabil-
ity ’ would not cover arrangements that lack a sanctioning system. I prefer 
a more pragmatic understanding of accountability that includes all kinds of 
accountability arrangements, including the self-imposed. 75 It runs against 
the practical wisdom of the Global Administrative Law project to disregard 
the latter; more logical is to refer to thin or imperfect accountability. 76 Such 
a notion also helps underline the existence of many variations in account-
ability schemes and, within each variation, the many rules and procedures 
that can produce effective or less effective accountability. 77 
 Bovens sees a threefold rationale (democratic, constitutional and learn-
ing) for public accountability (the object of his analysis) with two addi-
tional indirect rationales (legitimacy and catharsis). Public accountability 
serves the democratic perspective, helping citizens to hold responsible those 
in public offi ce. Accountability arrangements prevent the development of 
concentrations of power, and they enhance the learning capacity and effec-
tiveness of public administration. Behind these three perspectives lurks a far 
greater, more abstract concern with legitimacy: processes of accountability 
provide opportunities to explain and justify intentions, and to obtain feed-
back from other actors, enhancing acceptance and confi dence. 78 The other 
indirect rationale that Bovens identifi es is closely linked to the legitimacy 
concern and deals with  catharsis : 
 In the incidental case of tragedies, fi ascos and failures, processes of public account 
giving may also have an important ritual, purifying function — they can help to 
provide public  catharsis . Public account giving can help to bring a tragic period 
to an end because it can offer a platform for the victims to voice their grievances, 
and for the real or reputed perpetrators to account for themselves and to justify or 
excuse their conduct. This can be an important secondary effect of parliamentary 
inquiries, offi cial investigations or public hearings in cases of natural disasters, 
plane crashes or railroad accidents. The South African  ‘ truth commissions ’ , and 
various war crime tribunals, starting with the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials, the 
Eichmann trial, up to the Yugoslav tribunal are at least partly meant to fulfi l 
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this function. Public processes of calling to account create the opportunity for 
penitence, reparation and forgiveness, and can thus provide social or political 
closure. 79 
 Bovens observes that neither legitimacy nor catharsis can be easily evaluated, 
since they concern meta-effects, which explains why he narrows down his 
analysis to three principal direct reasons for accountability: democratic con-
trol, constitutional or countervailing powers, and learning. 80 Each of these 
perspectives yields a separate theoretical perspective on the rationale behind 
accountability and a separate perspective for the assessment of account-
ability relations. 81 Moreover, they sometimes point in different directions; 
accountability arrangements can score well from one perspective, but not 
from others. 82 This explains the importance of the  ‘ why-question ’ regarding 
accountability:  why is accountability important and what is the purpose of 
the various different forms of accountability ? 83 
 X. ACCOUNTABILITY IN GLOBAL CRIMINAL LAW: 
PERFECT AND IMPERFECT ARRANGEMENTS 
 Accountability is a diffi cult concept for lawyers. Usually they avoid talking 
about it, but when they do, they see nothing else in law. A fi ne example is 
Rebecca Brown ’ s 1998 article on  ‘ Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitu-
tion ’ . By looking at constitutionalism from the viewpoint of accountability 
rather than democracy, the author comes to a  ‘ different model of constitu-
tionalism ’ and a different understanding of American constitutionalism, one 
that depicts accountability as a structural feature of the Constitution, simi-
lar to separation of powers, checks and balances, or federalism, the purpose 
of which is to protect liberty. 84 
 Similarly, accountability is probably intrinsic to classic criminal law: 
 following up on criminal facts with a court procedure  is (bringing) account-
ability. Courts in states with international human rights monitoring are 
used to having their performance judged against certain standards. These 
accountability requirements have been spelled out by supervisory bodies 
such as the Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights and 
the UN Human Rights Committee, and most clearly in the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): 85 violations of human 
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rights such as the right to life need to be followed by an independent and 
effective investigation capable of identifying those responsible and deter-
mining whether the force used was justifi ed. The investigation must also be 
prompt and expeditious, and  ‘ there must be a suffi cient element of public 
scrutiny of the investigation or of its results to secure accountability in prac-
tice as well as in theory ’ . 86 
 In global criminal law, the accountability standard is directed towards all 
actors involved. Coming back to the  gut-felt necessity to have accountability 
everywhere in some way or another, de Serpa Soares subtly observes that 
we have only recently entered  An Age of Accountability. 87 The  guts now 
feel different to some time ago. Only now is the time right for recognising 
an individual and collective right to justice (to see perpetrators brought to 
justice) next to the connected right to know about injustices. 88 De Serpa 
Soares sees enforcing both rights at the international level, when states are 
unwilling to act, as falling within the broad mandate of the UN to maintain 
international peace and security spelled out in the UN Charter, 89 and as a 
response to contemporary demands by the international community. 
 Accountability, too, is also modular, as is well known to professionals of 
transnational justice with its arsenal of accountability mechanisms. Exist-
ing options range from commissions of inquiry ( ‘ truth commissions ’ ), pros-
ecutions and lustration to compensation for victims. 90 The trial of Charles 
Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone ran in conjunction with truth 
commissions and localised accountability processes in both Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. 91 In Kenya, constitutional reforms were introduced at the 
same time as a truth commission, a judicial vetting board and the prosecu-
tion of senior offi cials before the ICC. 92 In the context of transparency, 
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I briefl y referred to the possible negative impact of the Rome Statute and the 
mandate of the ICC on accountability mechanisms other than trials. Social 
scientists have criticised this legalistic view on confl ict resolution, calling 
for a radical reconceptualisation of the notion of  ‘ accountability ’ to move 
beyond the narrow deployment of the term as synonymous with criminal 
trials. 93 
 A growing body of specialised conventions and case law of treaty 
supervisory bodies such as the Inter-American Court and Commission on 
Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee impose a duty on 
states to prosecute individuals for certain crimes (such as genocide, war 
crimes,  torture and disappearances). However, many cases reported in 
Kritz ’ s  Transnational Justice suggest that (newly established or transitional) 
governments are unwilling to respect these duties for a variety of reasons 
(concern for national reconciliation or fear of upsetting prior government 
connected fractions). Equally signifi cant is a lack of state-to-state pressure. 
Ratner also makes a point of the lack of a clear well-defi ned international 
law duty to prosecute these crimes: there might be extended jurisdiction to 
act, but this does not strictly impose a legal duty to act. 94 
 XI. PARTICIPATION (THE THIRD GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLE) 
 Of the three governance concepts with which this chapter is concerned, 
participation is the least compelling or absolute, 95 although its democratic 
undertone is intuitively seductive. Like transparency, it is instrumental in 
bringing about accountability. There is a thin line between accountability 
and participation, but they can be distinguished analytically: accountability 
is by defi nition retrospective, while participation is a mechanism to provide 
proactive input in policy processes. 96 
 In good governance literature, participation is usually understood as the 
idea that citizens must be more systematically involved in the drafting and 
implementation of policies. 97 Transparency and openness can make more 
participation by the public possible, assuming that citizens have the oppor-
tunity to make known and publicly exchange views, that there is an open, 
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transparent and regular dialogue with the public or that broad consultations 
are carried out and citizen ’ s initiatives are taken seriously. 98 Participation 
is seen as one of the four distinct procedural justice principles when deal-
ing with citizens (others are neutrality, respect and trust). 99 The benefi ts 
are enormous in terms of satisfaction, compliance and legitimacy: if people 
have the opportunity to tell their side of the story before decisions are made 
and feel that what they say is being considered, this positively affects their 
experience with the legal system, irrespective of the outcome, assuming that 
the decision was properly communicated (ie, in the case of an unfavourable 
outcome, that the decision-maker communicates that citizens ’ views were 
taken into account, but unfortunately could not infl uence the decision). 
 The foregoing concerns the participation of the public, but that does not 
exhaust the idea of participation. Like other governance principles, par-
ticipation can be modulated towards different sectors and applied very nar-
rowly (only involving some stakeholders) or widened through mechanisms 
of consultation, notice, comment and hearings. Involving the public is one 
option, but is not necessarily mandatory. 100 Inspiration for modelling the 
kind of participation one seeks for actors at the global level can be found in 
domestic law, but this is only a source of inspiration. 101 The deep level of 
interdependency in nation states is not always reached in the global sphere, 
and giving  all people equal rights to participation even in matters that 
impact more on some than on others seems unjustifi able. 102 It might also 
sometimes be preferable not to insist on civil society participation at the 
global level, especially when dealing with countries that have a poor track 
record on civil liberties, where no genuine freedom for civil society groups 
can be expected. 103 
 Governance literature has produced a wealth of valuable insights on con-
cepts of participation, sometimes confl icting but always such as to make 
us cautious when advocating participation. For instance, we have been 
alerted to be sensitive to the right  ‘ process moment ’ in the policy-making 
cycle (formulation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation) for 
incorporating participation. We learn that involving citizens and experts 
in investigating and questioning evidence and information has a greater 
effect on the preferences of participants than involving them in the fi nal 
stages.  Participation can also serve to increase awareness of options and 
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 perspectives and to overcome biases. 104 Commonly it is felt that participa-
tion is not to be used as a decision-making procedure. 105 
 It is important to avoid naivety, with its tendency to produce  depoliticised 
analysis and prescriptions. States are seldom neutral and it would be 
 ‘ angelical ’ to assume that they are suffi ciently so in important matters that 
affect their interests. Similarly, civil society is not a plus in all respects. 
An angelical perspective of civil society ignores that it is by its very nature 
heterogeneous, organised around the interests and common perceptions of 
participants, with collective self-interest playing a major role. 106 There is 
also selection bias in the stakeholders invited to participate, possible result-
ing in externally funded NGOs dominating the negotiation spaces (and the 
absence of smaller local NGOs), and avoidance of involvement of more dis-
sident voices, leading to pro-government selection bias in terms of who gets 
invited. 107 Finally, given the emphasis in contemporary governance on ad 
hoc expert groups, transparency and participation may clash, with the drive 
for transparency leading to information-sharing among (some) policy actors 
and thereby running the risk of making these deliberations non-public: par-
adoxically, the drive for transparency might render public administration 
less accountable in a democratic sense. 108 
 XII. PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL CRIMINAL LAW: A SIDE DISH ? 
 The participation concept usefully brings to light the political dimension of 
global criminal law: the question  who sits at the table enriches the typical 
depoliticised lawyers view on treaties and norms, and reconnects with basic 
social science insights on governance. A recurrent theme in Boister ’ s han-
dling of transnational criminal law is  ‘ norm entrepreneurialism ’ , by which 
(usually powerful) states export their domestic criminal laws into the inter-
national realm. 109 The analysis helps to remind us of the  ‘ messy political 
nature of reality ’ . 110 Boister seems to believe that reality is less messy with 
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regard to classical international criminal law where states participate and 
engage with each other with a higher moral aim to protect basic common 
values, as opposed to transnational treaty drafting, where states are driven 
by specifi c individualised state interests. Kotiswaran and Palmer elegantly 
narrow this distinction in terms of the way in which treaties are negotiated 
by pointing to many self-interested moves by those present at the moment 
of negotiating the Rome Statute. 111 The ICC is a good test case when 
it comes to participation. Already during the Rome Conference, a  panoply 
of state delegates, NGO representatives and academics participated in 
 drafting the Statute. The democratic character of these participations is 
questionable, given that none of them was elected to draft the most impor-
tant international criminal law bill up to date. Immi Tallgren, for instance, 
held that  ‘ any democratic control  … will at best be retroactive, at the point 
of ratifi cation ’ . 112 
 Within the criminal law system, Brants, Mevis and Prakken understand 
 participation as participation of the accused and of the public, but also of 
the victim and other private persons (investigators, consultants, experts etc) 
in criminal proceedings. 113 Brems and Lavrysen show how participation has 
been picked up by the ECtHR as a right to participate effectively in a (fair) 
trial and a right to be involved in investigations on, and decisions about, the 
rights to life, integrity, privacy and family life. 114 Part of the current devel-
opment towards the recognition of victim rights has most defi nitely been 
co-triggered by this Court. 
 Moffett ’ s study on victim rights before the ICC recalls the history of 
the growing recognition of victim interests in international criminal law 
and rightly welcomes the participatory rights attributed to victims under 
Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute. 115 Having struck the balance exception-
ally well between sympathies for victims and the understanding that many 
other interests are also at play in criminal law, Moffett outlines the benefi ts 
of victim participation and the need to balance this with other interests 
and the purpose of international criminal justice and its dominant retribu-
tive focus. 116 One of the tensions concerns confl icting interests of parties 
involved, not only those of the defence, but also of the Prosecutor in deter-
mining the selection of charges. 117 Within the existing framework, Moffett 
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tries to make the ICC more victim-oriented (without adopting a restorative 
justice approach) in the investigation phase, the trial phase and in sentenc-
ing proceedings. The  Lubanga case, with its well-known confl ict between 
the victims and the Prosecutor, has allowed the ICC (and academics like 
Moffett) to defend more clearly the balance that must be struck in light of 
the many alternative views on victim participation. 118 
 However, there exist less overt contributions to the ICC judicial  process 
by participants not explicitly recognised under the Rome Statute. The 
Offi ce of the Prosecutor has held consultations with civil society, so-called 
NGO round tables:  ‘ the Offi ce of the Prosecutor ’ s interaction with local 
and international NGOs is relevant at all stages of its activities, including 
development of policies/practices, prevention, promotion of domestic leg-
islation and proceedings, preliminary examination, investigation, prosecu-
tion, cooperation, maximizing the impact of its work and its understanding 
by victims and affected communities ’ . 119 Furthermore, in 2012, the Offi ce 
of the Prosecutor appointed three Special Advisers, persons with recognised 
expertise in their fi eld, who provide advice to the Prosecutor at her request 
or on their own initiative on training, policies, procedures and legal submis-
sions. More specifi cally, the Offi ce of the Prosecutor appointed a Special 
Adviser on International Criminal Law Prosecution Strategies, a Special 
Adviser on Crimes against Humanity and a Special Adviser on Children in 
and Affected by Armed Confl ict. During the adjudicative process, Amicus 
Curiae observations are a device by which outside participants such as aca-
demics and NGOs can have a say and infl uence the judicial reasoning. 120 
 Another kind of participation is made possible by the principle of com-
plementarity in the ICC Statute and the day-to-day use of hybrid courts. 
Greater legitimacy, local ownership, a greater connection to victims and 
capacity-building are among the asserted advantages of hybrid tribunals, 121 
and all have to do with bringing in local and domestic law. Much critical 
legal and empirical research is looking closely at these courts, often with 
Globalisation, Crime and Governance 115
 122  Bovens (n 72) 462 – 67. 
 123  ibid 465. 
 124  See Peters (n 29) 265 – 66 and 279 – 80. See also  RH  Weber ,  ‘ The Crucial Triangle : 
 Analysis of the Links between Transparency, Accountability and Participation in the Informa-
tion Society ’ in  E  Schweighofer ,  F  Kummer and  W  H ö tzendorfer (eds),  Transparenz ( Salzburg , 
 IRIS ,  2014 )  195 . 
useful recommendations for coping with this prime example of constitu-
tional pluralism, although there is a tendency to require  ‘ perfect justice ’ 
which fi ts uneasily with the legal pluralism that such courts embody. 
 XIII. A METHOD FOR APPLYING TRANSPARENCY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND PARTICIPATION ? 
 It should by now be obvious that I regard our three concepts as intercon-
nected: transparency should be understood in a holistic and proactive man-
ner, as openness, as only in that form might it actually enable participation, 
with transparency and participation instrumentally related to accountabil-
ity. This makes applying transparency, accountability and participation no 
easy matter, and tensions between the three and between the ends sought 
with a particular accountability arrangement add to the complexity. 
 In assessing these interactions and tensions, it is useful to return to Bovens ’ 
 ‘ why-question ’ regarding accountability:  why is accountability important 
and what is the purpose of the various different forms of accountability ? 122 
The answer to this will allow a deeper understanding of the accountability 
principle, but also of the possible limits to the principles of participation 
and transparency. Bovens ’ grid of (direct) reasons for accountability —
 democratic control, constitutional or countervailing powers and learning —
 is particularly useful. 123 It gives three reasons to want accountability and 
three reasons that might and probably will give way to different govern-
ance options about transparency, accountability and participation. It should 
be noted that the two indirect purposes of accountability — legitimacy and 
catharsis — are also important in this regard. So, what does one want:  demo-
cratic control, constitutional or countervailing powers, learning, legitimacy 
or catharsis, or a combination of these ? 
 Whether international organisations need to be accountable not only to 
states, but also to (global) citizens; whether parliaments need to be built into 
organisations such as the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), 124 whether magistrates need to be involved in 
truth commissions, how many international judges need to sit in a hybrid 
court, or whether citizens or domestic judges need to be actively involved in 
(international) adjudication are all questions that should be answered along 
these lines. This exercise requires an in-depth comprehension of how human 
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understanding develops in interactions, 125 actors and the institutions they 
represent, 126 and an awareness that several alternative answers can often be 
defended. Requiring direct participation by the public everywhere will not 
do, nor does it correspond to actual practices in transitional justice and the 
organisation of the criminal law apparatus. 
 In this context we should recall Rubenstein ’ s beautiful demonstration that 
the question  ‘ who elected Oxfam ? ’ quite misses the point. 127 This author 
argues that conceptualising international NGOs as representation bodies 
is far from fl awless and that when it comes to NGOs, the onus should be 
on the constitutional, countervailing perspective. 128 This does not exclude 
arrangements that take other perspectives into account, but it does make us 
understand the actual and possible limits to the idea of representation in the 
area of global criminal justice: the democratic perspective is one of the per-
spectives that, depending on the context, need or need not be emphasised. 
 XIV. CONCLUSIONS 
 In this chapter I defi ned global criminal law as a paradigm for understand-
ing developments of criminal law affected by globalisation that seeks to go 
beyond international criminal law  strictu senso and its fi x on adjudication 
by international tribunals, and transitional justice ’ s focus on treaty-making. 
There is simply more happening than international courts judging cases 
and active states exporting criminal law choices via treaties. Welcome to 
the world of political solutions to crimes, of non-legal responses, of policy- 
making by judges, prosecutors and national and international NGOs. 
 Rather than a constitutionalist programme for global criminal law with 
substantive principles, 129 my ideas are partly driven by a certain cynicism 
about principled approaches to (criminal) law, especially when they are sub-
stantively oriented and rigidly presented as fact. I therefore turned to the 
Global Administrative Law project (2005) and the proposals by Brants et al 
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in 2001 for more procedurally oriented guidelines or principles to address 
issues of globalisation, in particular transparency, accountability and par-
ticipation. The role and weight of these fl exible, process-oriented princi-
ples need to be grasped and adjusted to the context of each actor and their 
respective purpose and power. Domestic law, including constitutional law, 
may be a rich source of inspiration, but, from a pluralist, comparative and 
multi-stakeholder perspective, does not deliver defi nitive answers. 
 I have discussed the application and understanding of transparency, 
participation and accountability in the administration of global criminal 
justice. At fi rst sight, there seems to be no objection to applying these prin-
ciples to actors and problems of global criminal justice. There is often a 
 ‘ gut feeling ’ that these principles need to be there somehow, which accounts 
for a  ‘ situation of presence ’ : there is already often some transparency, an 
accountability arrangement, some way of participating in policy-impacting 
decisions, either by public actors or by private actors exercising some form 
of quasi-governmental power. 
 This chapter has illustrated thin and thick applications of the three prin-
ciples, identifying among other things  openness as a thick version of trans-
parency and defending imperfect arrangements of accounting as forms of 
 accountability. None of the principles comes to us as absolute. In particular, 
transparency serves broader values, such as accountability and participa-
tion; full transparency is not always required and is therefore not an abso-
lute value or principle (a good per se) . 
 The three principles usually reinforce each other, but might show internal 
tensions. A mandatory process of legal accountability via courts can block 
democratic processes in transitional states. There are many more tensions 
that need to be taken into consideration. Borrowing Bovens ’ analytical grid 
about the threefold direct rationales of accountability (democratic, consti-
tutional and learning), complemented by two additional indirect rationales 
(legitimacy and catharsis), I hope to have shown that the application of 
governance principles may be good from one perspective and less ideal from 
another, and that we should not ignore a constitutional perspective on legal 
and non-legal developments in the area of global criminal law. 
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